JANE'S MISSILES AND ROCKETS - OCTOBER 01, 2001
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Arrow tested at longer range
節錄
The system has been designed to cope with ballistic missiles, with ranges
of up to 1,500km,so has the performance needed to engage Scuds (with
ranges of 300-500km), Scud derivatives(with ranges of 600km or more)
and Iran's Shahab-3 (with a range of 1,300-1,500km)
JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
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DATE: AUGUST 01, 1995 EDITION: 1995
VOLUME/ISSUE: 007/008 James Bruce
A Successful Programme
節錄
Uzi Rubin, chief of the Israel Missile Defence Office, disclosed in
January that six operational tests will be conducted on Arrow-2 over
the next 18 months. The first flight tests of the 6.3 m long missile
are scheduled for mid-year, one at a target altitude of 50 km and
the second at 8-10 km altitude.
Back in the melting pot
Mark Hewish
Terminal Defense Segment
節錄
The company has also proposed a multifaceted service-life
extension program (SLEP) that would extend Patriot's life to 2032, including
the introduction of a 'PAC-2 Hit-to-Kill' round as a complement or alternative
to PAC-3. This would replace the baseline IR homing head and blast-fragmentation
warhead with a kinetic payload and millimeter-wave radar seeker, and add a
sideways-firing thruster package for greater terminal maneuverability.
The proposed new seeker is a variant of that developed earlier under the Patriot
Anti-Cruise Missile (PACM) project, which successfully engaged air-breathing
targets during flight-testing. The US Army elected not to proceed with PACM,
and says it is likewise committed to PAC-3, but the low cost of the PAC-2
Hit-to-Kill conversion - claimed by Raytheon to be only one-quarter that of
buying a new PAC-3 - may sway its decision.
這裡還有一篇
INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE DIGEST, ARROW 2 MISSILE CLOSER TO OPERATIONAL STATUS p 5
INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW
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DATE: JANUARY 01, 1996
EDITION: 1996
VOLUME/ISSUE: 029/001 The 280km-range Scud B, which has a descent-velocity of approximately 1,600m/s,
and the faster, 11m-long Scud C which has a 500km range, represent the baseline
threat against which Arrow 2 is designed to provide defense.
來來來 還沒完
Israel Aircraft Industries Arrow Weapon System (AWS) Date Posted: 16-Sep-2004
Jane's Land-Based Air Defence
The seeker used is dual mode with a passive IR system to acquire and track TBMs
and an active radar unit to combat air-breathing targets amid heavy countermeasures at lower altitudes
Specifications Arrow-2
Range:
(max) 90,000 m
(max effective) 70,000 m
Altitude limits:
(max) 50,000 m
(min) 8,000 m
Missile velocity: M9
George N. Lewis is Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Lisbeth Gronlund is Senior Scientist and Co-Director of the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists in Cambridge, MA and a Senior Research Associate at the MIT Security Studies Program. Both hold Ph.D.s in physics from Cornell University. A shorter version of this report is published in Arms Control Today, December 2002, pp. 12-14, available at http://www.armscontrol.org.
Executive Summary
The Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is increasingly resistant to providing detailed reports to Congress on the progress of US missile defense programs, and has recently decided to classify more information about its missile defense intercept tests. In such a time of reduced Congressional and independent oversight, it is especially important to understand the extent to which information provided by the MDA is credible and trustworthy.
In this context, we have examined in detail statements made by MDA Director Lt. General Ronald Kadish in recent Congressional testimony, in which he argued that the test record for hit-to-kill missile defenses demonstrates that these missile defense systems will work. Specifically, General Kadish testified that many of the test failures were due to quality control problems that prevented the interceptor from reaching the “endgame” of the intercept attempt, but that when the tests actually reach the endgame, the interceptors have a very high success rate of 88 percent. Moreover, he argued that this high “endgame success”rate shows that the technical feasibility of missile defenses is not in question.
We find that this argument is wrong on several counts: First, the numbers Kadish uses are incorrect; he undercounts the number of endgame failures. Second, he inappropriately combines test data for midcourse and terminal missile defenses, even though they operate quite differently from one another. Third, for both midcourse and terminal systems, the endgame success rate is actually slightly lower than the success rate prior to the endgame. Fourth, there is no reason to consider the endgame success rate rather than the overall success rate—since quality control errors can and have occurred in all phases of the tests. Taking into account failures that occur both prior to and during the endgame, the overall success rate for midcourse systems drops to 41 percent. Finally, and most important, all of the hit-to-kill tests conducted to date have—as the MDA itself notes—included numerous “limitations” and “artificialities,” so even a perfect test record would say little about the ability of thesystem to operate under realistic operational conditions.
Our analysis shows that regardless of how the test results are tabulated, they do not indicate anything meaningful about the technical feasibility of the missile defense systems under development. The MDA analysis that Kadish presented to Congress is based on misrepresenting the results of past tests, and its conclusions are wrong and misleading. This raises serious questions about the recent MDA decision to classify information about its future intercept tests, since this will make it nearly impossible to check its claims. It also indicates how important it is that MDA programs be subject to continuing and increased Congressional and independent oversight. 作者: ViewSonic 時間: 06-5-7 08:09 標題: 回覆: 彈道飛彈與彈道飛彈防禦 台灣自行研發～雄風三型飛彈
6月23日，美國、蘇聯在新澤西州葛拉斯博洛(Glassboro)的高峰會中，美國總統詹森(Lyndon B. Johnson)和國防部長麥納瑪拉(Robert McNamara)，與蘇聯總理科錫金(Alexei Kosygin)，討論戰略防衛佈署與攻擊武力規模的關係。美方建議接納戰略性反彈道飛彈系統，但為蘇聯所拒絕。
1985～大女兒出生 3月12日，美蘇在日內瓦展開核子與太空(武器)談判(Nuclear and Space Talks, NST)。其中在防衛與太空談判(Defense and Space Talks, DST)的部份，美方希望談有關從單純依賴核武報復的威脅以求嚇阻，轉變為更加依賴陸地或太空為基地的彈道飛彈防禦。而對於美方發展SDI，蘇聯的反應是全面禁止研發、佈署「太空武器」。
1994 1月24日--2月4日，在限制目標飛彈(即彈道飛彈)速度的同時，俄國也提議限制TMD攔截飛彈的速度為每秒3公里(約8.82馬赫)。在這項限制下，美國陸軍的戰區高空層區域防禦(Theater High Altitude Area Defense, THAAD)系統和海軍的低空層防禦系統(即NAD)可以佈署，但速度較快的系統，如海軍的高空層防禦系統(即NTW)和空軍的空射型、敵彈升空階段攔截的系統，就不在允許之列。美方拒絕這項提議。
作者: ViewSonic 時間: 06-5-7 23:00 標題: 回覆: 彈道飛彈與彈道飛彈防禦 以下為反彈道條約全文 ～國際英文版～ TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS
In the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems the United States and the Soviet Union agree that each may have only two ABM deployment areas,1 so restricted and so located that they cannot provide a nationwide ABM defense or become the basis for developing one. Each country thus leaves unchallenged the penetration capability of the others retaliatory missile forces. The Treaty permits each side to have one limited ABM system to protect its capital and another to protect an ICBM launch area. The two sites defended must be at least 1,300 kilometers apart, to prevent the creation of any effective regional defense zone or the beginnings of a nationwide system. Precise quantitative and qualitative limits are imposed on the ABM systems that may be deployed. At each site there may be no more than 100 interceptor missiles and 100 launchers. Agreement on the number and characteristics of radars to be permitted had required extensive and complex technical negotiations, and the provisions governing these important components of ABM systems are spelled out in very specific detail in the Treaty and further clarified in the "Agreed Statements" accompanying it. Both Parties agreed to limit qualitative improvement of their ABM technology, e.g., not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers capable of launching more than one interceptor missile at a time or modify existing launchers to give them this capability, and systems for rapid reload of launchers are similarly barred. These provisions, the Agreed Statements clarify, also ban interceptor missiles with more than one independently guided warhead. There had been some concern over the possibility that surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) intended for defense against aircraft might be improved, along with their supporting radars, to the point where they could effectively be used against ICBMs and SLBMs, and the Treaty prohibits this. While further deployment of radars intended to give early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack is not prohibited, such radars must be located along the territorial boundaries of each country and oriented outward, so that they do not contribute to an effective ABM defense of points in the interior. Further, to decrease the pressures of technological change and its unsettling impact on the strategic balance, both sides agree to prohibit development, testing, or deployment of sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems and their components, along with mobile land-based ABM systems. Should future technology bring forth new ABM systems "based on other physical principles" than those employed in current systems, it was agreed that limiting such systems would be discussed, in accordance with the Treatys provisions for consultation and amendment. The Treaty also provides for a U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission to promote its objectives and implementation. The commission was established during the first negotiating session of SALT II, by a Memorandum of Understanding dated December 21, 1972. Since then both the United States and the Soviet Union have raised a number of questions in the Commission relating to each sides compliance with the SALT I agreements. In each case raised by the United States, the Soviet activity in question has either ceased or additional information has allayed U.S. concern. Article XIV of the Treaty calls for review of the Treaty five years after its entry into force, and at five-year intervals thereafter. The first such review was conducted by the Standing Consultative Commission at its special session in the fall of 1977. At this session, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that the Treaty had operated effectively during its first five years, that it had continued to serve national security interests, and that it did not need to be amended at that time. The most recent Treaty review was completed in October 1993. Following that review, numerous sessions of the Standing Consultative Commission have been held to work out Treaty succession -- to "multilateralize" the Treaty -- as a result of the break-up of the Soviet Union and to negotiate a demarcation between ABM and non-ABM systems. __________________ 1 Subsequently reduced to one area (See section on ABM Protocol)
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS
Signed at Moscow May 26, 1972 Ratification advised by U.S. Senate August 3, 1972 Ratified by U.S. President September 30, 1972 Proclaimed by U.S. President October 3, 1972 Instruments of ratification exchanged October 3, 1972 Entered into force October 3, 1972
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind, Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons, Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms, Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarma-ment, and general and complete disarmament, Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States, Have agreed as follows: Article I 1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. 2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.
Article II 1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:
(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode; (b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and (c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.
2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those which are:
(a) operational; (b) under construction; (c) undergoing testing; (d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or (e) mothballed.
Article III Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:
(a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and centered on the Partys national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than three kilometers; and (b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM radars.
Article IV The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges.
Article V 1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. 2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, not to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capacity, not to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers. Article VI To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by the Treaty, each Party undertakes:
(a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; and (b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.
Article VII Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out. Article VIII ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time. Article IX To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty. Article X Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty. Article XI The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms. Article XII 1. For the purpose of providing assurance or compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. 2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. 3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices. Article XIII 1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will:
(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous; (b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed; (c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification; (d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty; (e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty; (f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty; including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty; (g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.
2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters. Article XIV 1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty. 2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty. Article XV 1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. Article XVI 1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification. 2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
DONE at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: RICHARD NIXON President of the United States of America FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: L. I. BREZHNEV General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU作者: ViewSonic 時間: 06-5-7 23:07 標題: 回覆: 彈道飛彈與彈道飛彈防禦 反彈道飛彈條約
中程增程防空系統 Medium Extended Air Defense System, MEADS 它是專為北大西洋公約組織(North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO)盟軍所設計的區域防空暨反飛彈兩用系統，目前參與研發的國家除了美國，還包括德國與義大利。原先有意參加的法國，在1996年簽署合作備忘錄前夕決定退出。 MEADS原來的名稱叫作「軍團地對空飛彈(Corps Surface-to-Air Missile, Corps SAM)系統」，是為了取代服役30多年的鷹式(HAWK)飛彈、羅蘭(Roland)飛彈等。之所以有「中程」之名，是因為這套系統在功能上，將彌補鷹式飛彈除役後，THAAD、PAC-3和低空的刺針飛彈中間的防空火力斷層。 至於彈種則採用愛國者飛彈PAC-3，但是和前述的第三代愛國者不同的是，MEADS將混合使用兩種彈頭。和第三代愛國者一樣的動能彈頭，用來對付彈道飛彈，而另一種預成破片彈頭，則用來負擔一般防空和打擊巡弋飛彈的任務。
戰區高空層區域防禦 Theater High Altitude Area Defense, THAAD 和愛國者一樣是由陸軍負責的計畫。THAAD自1992年開始研發，而從1995年4月21日到1999年8月2日，THAAD總共進行11次試射，地點都在新墨西哥州的白沙飛彈試射場。11次試射中，第3次(1995年10月13日)開始有靶彈參與測試，而從第4次(1995年12月13日)以後則是驗證攔截飛彈能否和靶彈進行有效碰撞。從第4次到第9次(1999年5月29日)總共6次都告失敗。直到第10次(1999年6月10日)和第11次(1999年8月2日)，才有連續兩次成功的紀錄。 之後五角大廈方面下令停止在白沙試射場的試射，並責成主管官員把THAAD計畫推進到「工程與製造發展(engineering and manufacture development, EMD)」階段，也就是準備讓THAAD準時於2007年能完成佈署。在這期間的測試工作將移往南太平洋的瓜加林島進行。 THAAD和愛國者飛彈的共同點，就是都以車載型的發射架、雷達、射控中心及電源供應來編組，以確保其機動部署能力。1個THAAD飛彈連，預計有9組發射器和150枚飛彈。飛彈性能諸元如下表。
EKV的主承包商有兩家，分別是波音公司和雷神公司，而在1998年12月，NMD計畫下的先期系統整合小組(Lead System Integrator, LSI)，選擇雷神公司的設計，但波音公司的設計也被保留，以降低技術風險。 而在發射基地方面，根據BMDO的「全國飛彈防禦系統佈署草案環境影響報告(NMD Deployment Draft Environment Impact Statement)」，目前可能的地點有5個，包括阿拉斯加州的克利爾空軍雷達站(Clear Air Force Station)、葛利里堡(Fort Greely)陸軍航空站、艾爾森空軍基地(Eielson Air Force Base)、北達科達州的格蘭德佛克斯空軍基地(Grand Forks Air Force Base)和史坦利麥克森基地(Stanley R. Mickelsen Safeguard Complex)。 其中史坦利麥克森基地，就是1975到1976年，美國依據ABM條約建立的反彈道飛彈基地(詳見『反彈道飛彈條約』)，但早在1976年即因運作成本太高而關閉。 發射基地的平面設計圖如下(可能因選定地點而稍有變更)
改良型早期預警雷達
Upgraded Early Warning Radar, UEWR 美國現有3座早期預警雷達(EWR)，分別位於阿拉斯加州的克利爾空軍雷達站(Clear Air Force Station)、加利福尼亞州的畢爾空軍基地(Beale Air Force Base)、麻塞諸塞州的寇德角空軍雷達站(Cape Cod Air Force Station)。
附加檔案: pic01pac3_lrg_6045.jpg
