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回覆: 利用核武器大量殺傷軍民，24小時內解放台灣
PAC-3為新一代專為攔截導彈所設計的地對空飛彈,除了沿用"愛國者"名稱外,其他設計與PAC-1/2完全不同
1.PAC-3尋標頭
2.側面小孔為火箭噴射控制裝置
3.16枚PAC-3組成一個發射單元
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PAC-3射得更高也更遠，就是因為它不需要那顆呆重而能夠直接擊中目標。
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PAC-3要做小的原因, 是因為直接命中的需求. 和側噴的限制. 這是設計上最先要討論的. (SHRIT FLAGE)
雷神也曾經有patriot hit to kill 的概念彈. 直接從pac-2衍生過來. 他所提到的接戰空域和高度就遠勝pac-3
彈道飛彈的射程越遠，則落地速度越快。
落地速度越快則你需要在更高的高度攔截它，否則你根本來不及攔截。
防空飛彈與彈道飛彈一樣是靠短暫的推力「拋擲」，所以射高高就表示必要時拋物線彈道遠。
pac-3 是靠彈體的側推來使彈體打出攻角產生G值. 射高高彈体反應慢. 命中機率低很多.
至於打遠, 你可以查一下彈上電池能供應幾秒. 這個公開的paper都有提到.
雷達性能當然是關鍵，但飛彈一樣要有足夠的射高。
以PAC-2或S-300/400這種肥重的飛彈，攔截的目標最多只有600公里等級的彈道飛彈，或是減速過的1000公里級飛彈。
彈體反應, 尋標器精度. 用翅膀跟用側噴的反應速度差很多. 用C,X-band TVM的跟用ka-band主動的精度差 很多. 我提醒過你這個了. 可以去看看paper.
要超過，就必須改用兩截彈頭，跟彈道飛彈一樣，防空飛彈拆成多節一樣可以達到更高的高度，所以可以攔截落地速度更快的彈道
飛彈，可能是數千公里級。不過多節火箭的問題就是反而無法對付彈道比較低，速度比較慢的彈道飛彈。
老話一句, 你覺得arrow II如何. ? 只要速度到, 我也可以只用boost stage, 不用點燃sustainer.
arrow II的攔截高度是10 ~ 50km, 連飛機都可以打. SM-2 BLK IVA也是, 這兩者都還是帶彈頭的. 你覺得如何?
至於彈道高度, 要看攻擊者怎麼想. 在射程範圍內, 要用高彈道或最遠彈道是看他. 速度比較慢不一定彈道較低.
所以美國有PAC-3，用全新
的Layout，更輕更細的彈體，所以能超過傳統單節防空飛彈的極限，逼近雙截火箭的地步。別忘了PAC-3延伸自星戰計畫，星戰計畫
當年是要攔截上千公里的中程或洲際彈道飛彈。
SHIRT跟FLAGE的初始構想如何? 第一次攔截長矛靶彈的高度如何? 相信你可以查的到.
同樣SM-2 BLK IVA的設計概念與第一次攔截的高度與距離. 我相信對你也不是難事.
到底是哪個人到處散佈PAC-3射程射高不如PAC-2的觀念？沒有人寫點正確的觀念，外面真是各種似是而非，甚至完全相反的說法都有。
http://www.mnd.gov.tw/division.....5Z/459/6_content.htm
這篇文章算是網路上對PAC-3與彈到與反彈道之間的運動模型比較有概念的。大部分資料應該是來自於某期的AWST，也是我看過對這個議題最深入的公開資料。可惜沒有實際圖片的連結，不然可以更深刻的瞭解PAC-3絕對不是只是換了尋標器與控制方式的降級飛彈而已。
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/patriot-ac-3.htm
雖然GlobalSecurity的規格表還是那個不知道哪來的15公里射高的資料，不過這篇網頁中終於有點Sense：THAAD的攔截高度是60-80公里，而PAC-3彌補了40公里以下的空缺。
JANE'S MISSILES AND ROCKETS - OCTOBER 01, 2001
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arrow tested at longer range
節錄
The system has been designed to cope with ballistic missiles, with ranges
of up to 1,500km,so has the performance needed to engage Scuds (with
ranges of 300-500km), Scud derivatives(with ranges of 600km or more)
and Iran's Shahab-3 (with a range of 1,300-1,500km)
JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DATE: AUGUST 01, 1995 EDITION: 1995
VOLUME/ISSUE: 007/008 James Bruce
A Successful Programme
節錄
Uzi Rubin, chief of the Israel Missile Defence Office, disclosed in
January that six operational tests will be conducted on Arrow-2 over
the next 18 months. The first flight tests of the 6.3 m long missile
are scheduled for mid-year, one at a target altitude of 50 km and
the second at 8-10 km altitude.
Back in the melting pot
Mark Hewish
Terminal Defense Segment
節錄
The company has also proposed a multifaceted service-life
extension program (SLEP) that would extend Patriot's life to 2032, including
the introduction of a 'PAC-2 Hit-to-Kill' round as a complement or alternative
to PAC-3. This would replace the baseline IR homing head and blast-fragmentation
warhead with a kinetic payload and millimeter-wave radar seeker, and add a
sideways-firing thruster package for greater terminal maneuverability.
The proposed new seeker is a variant of that developed earlier under the Patriot
Anti-Cruise Missile (PACM) project, which successfully engaged air-breathing
targets during flight-testing. The US Army elected not to proceed with PACM,
and says it is likewise committed to PAC-3, but the low cost of the PAC-2
Hit-to-Kill conversion - claimed by Raytheon to be only one-quarter that of
buying a new PAC-3 - may sway its decision.
這裡還有一篇
INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE DIGEST, ARROW 2 MISSILE CLOSER TO OPERATIONAL STATUS p 5
INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DATE: JANUARY 01, 1996
EDITION: 1996
VOLUME/ISSUE: 029/001
The 280km-range Scud B, which has a descent-velocity of approximately 1,600m/s,
and the faster, 11m-long Scud C which has a 500km range, represent the baseline
threat against which Arrow 2 is designed to provide defense.
來來來 還沒完
Israel Aircraft Industries Arrow Weapon System (AWS) Date Posted: 16-Sep-2004
Jane's Land-Based Air Defence
The seeker used is dual mode with a passive IR system to acquire and track TBMs
and an active radar unit to combat air-breathing targets amid heavy countermeasures
at lower altitudes
Specifications Arrow-2
Range:
(max) 90,000 m
(max effective) 70,000 m
Altitude limits:
(max) 50,000 m
(min) 8,000 m
Missile velocity: M9
來看個影片 輕鬆一下
http://www.iai.co.il/STORAGE/files/6/24786.wmv
1分59秒的地方
旁白: booster燃畢分離, 第二節的sustainer點燃.
若以攔截彈道飛彈高度來分類，一般的認知是0-40 Km大氣密度高，而40-100Km幾無大氣(雖仍屬大氣層)，前者尚可利用利用氣動力控制飛彈（當然可以不只使用氣動力）及使用雷達，後者則必需藉助推力向量控制系統、姿態控制系統或側力控制系統控制飛彈及使用受到保護的IR，若無其它特殊考量，用40 Km做為防禦區域的高低分界，似乎是合理的...
若從FLAGE(2次)、ERINT(3次)、或PAC-3在2002年底以前的歷次測評(DT到OT-2)看(恕小弟尚未找到2003初以後的資料)，似乎沒有一次超過20Km高，實際攔截測試高度大約也就是在15公里左右。另外，THAAD除了在high endoatmospheric(THAAD的防區)外，亦有在大氣層外(100Km+)的成功攔截記錄(失敗的當然也有)
轉貼～
PAC-3及其相關成員在內攔截成功率的另類質疑報告
An Assessment of the Missile Defense Agency’s “Endgame Success” Argument
George N. Lewis
Lisbeth Gronlund
George N. Lewis is Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Lisbeth Gronlund is Senior Scientist and Co-Director of the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists in Cambridge, MA and a Senior Research Associate at the MIT Security Studies Program. Both hold Ph.D.s in physics from Cornell University. A shorter version of this report is published in Arms Control Today, December 2002, pp. 12-14, available at
http://www.armscontrol.org.
Executive Summary
The Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is increasingly resistant to providing detailed reports to Congress on the progress of US missile defense programs, and has recently decided to classify more information about its missile defense intercept tests. In such a time of reduced Congressional and independent oversight, it is especially important to understand the extent to which information provided by the MDA is credible and trustworthy.
In this context, we have examined in detail statements made by MDA Director Lt. General Ronald Kadish in recent Congressional testimony, in which he argued that the test record for hit-to-kill missile defenses demonstrates that these missile defense systems will work. Specifically, General Kadish testified that many of the test failures were due to quality control problems that prevented the interceptor from reaching the “endgame” of the intercept attempt, but that when the tests actually reach the endgame, the interceptors have a very high success rate of 88 percent. Moreover, he argued that this high “endgame success”rate shows that the technical feasibility of missile defenses is not in question.
We find that this argument is wrong on several counts: First, the numbers Kadish uses are incorrect; he undercounts the number of endgame failures. Second, he inappropriately combines test data for midcourse and terminal missile defenses, even though they operate quite differently from one another. Third, for both midcourse and terminal systems, the endgame success rate is actually slightly lower than the success rate prior to the endgame. Fourth, there is no reason to consider the endgame success rate rather than the overall success rate—since quality control errors can and have occurred in all phases of the tests. Taking into account failures that occur both prior to and during the endgame, the overall success rate for midcourse systems drops to 41 percent. Finally, and most important, all of the hit-to-kill tests conducted to date have—as the MDA itself notes—included numerous “limitations” and “artificialities,” so even a perfect test record would say little about the ability of the system to operate under realistic operational conditions.
Our analysis shows that regardless of how the test results are tabulated, they do not indicate anything meaningful about the technical feasibility of the missile defense systems under development. The MDA analysis that Kadish presented to Congress is based on misrepresenting the results of past tests, and its conclusions are wrong and misleading. This raises serious questions about the recent MDA decision to classify information about its future intercept tests, since this will make it nearly impossible to check its claims. It also indicates how important it is that MDA programs be subject to continuing and increased Congressional and independent oversight.
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